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Abstract
This article defines the key parameters of ‘state entrepreneurialism’ as a governance form that
combines planning centrality and market instruments, and interprets how these two seemingly
contradictory tendencies are made coherent in the political economic structures of post-reform
China. Through examining urban regeneration programmes (in particular ‘three olds regenera-
tion’, sanjiu gaizao), the development of suburban new towns and the reconstruction of the coun-
tryside, the article details institutional configurations that make the Chinese case different from a
neoliberal growth machine. The contradiction of these tendencies gives room to urban residents
and migrants to develop their agencies and their own spaces, and creates informalities in Chinese
urban transformation.
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Introduction: Understanding
Chinese urban governance
Understanding Chinese urban governance
requires an appropriate reading of the
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state–market relationship (Logan, 2008; Yeh
et al., 2015). A powerful paradigm is neoli-
beralism, which describes the retreat of the
state from social provision and the domi-
nance of market exchanges (Harvey, 2005).
The framework of the ‘urban process’ under
capitalism proposed by Harvey (1978) offers
a structural explanation of capital accumula-
tion and the consequential state role. His
seminal thesis of ‘urban entrepreneurialism’
(Harvey, 1989) explains the transformation
of urban governance from managerialism to
entrepreneurialism in advanced Western
market economies. The subsequent operatio-
nalisation of the thesis into the ‘entrepre-
neurial city’ (Jessop and Sum, 2000) has led
to its application to China (Chien, 2013; He
and Wu, 2009; Shin, 2009; Walker and
Buck, 2007; Wu, 2003), though there is scep-
ticism about neoliberalism as an appropriate
perspective (Le Gale`s, 2016; Ong, 2007). To
understand specifically how urban entrepre-
neurialism emerges, the changing role of the
state in governing urban transformation
should be contextualised with appropriate
attention to particular institutional settings.
In China, due to fiscal decentralisation
and greater local autonomy in the 1980s and
early 1990s, local officials began to behave
in ways that sought revenue maximisation.
‘Local state corporatism’ was a thesis to
describe rural cadres’ engagement in the
business of township and village enterprises
(TVEs) (Oi, 1992). They played a dual role
of state officials and business people. In
urban areas, the introduction of a real estate
market led to exploitation of market oppor-
tunities (Duckett, 2001). The fiscal responsi-
bility of local government was strengthened
with greater local decision-making auton-
omy, which turned local governments into
organisations similar to industrial firms
(Walder, 1995). More precisely, China’s
emergent city-region governance can be
appropriately understood as a state-
orchestrated rescaling process (Wu, 2016c).
Through institutional reform, the state
apparatus, in particular the local state,
demonstrates a greater interest in introducing,
developing and deploying market instruments
and engages in market-like entrepreneurial
activities. Thus, I define this state engagement
with the market and its entrepreneurial role
in this article as ‘state entrepreneurialism’.
Regarding the emergence of entrepreneur-
like behaviours in China, there are two dif-
ferent explanations. First, the behavioural
explanation stresses GDP-ism. The thesis of
the ‘GDP tournament’ emphasises that local
political leaders compete over targets for
GDP growth set by the central government
in order to gain career promotion (Li and
Zhou, 2005). GDP growth can be seen as an
‘achievement in office’, which is a major cri-
terion for cadre performance evaluation.
Secondly, the structural explanation stres-
ses the dynamics of land revenue generation
(Tao et al., 2010) to meet the demands of
local public expenditure (Su et al., 2012).
Due to the particular political economic sys-
tem (tax-sharing and land institutions), local
governments have faced an increasing gap
between income and expenditure. They have
not been allowed to issue municipal bonds
until recently in some experimental cities
and have had to use land development to
generate extra-budgetary revenues. Through
encouraging industrial development and its
spill-over effects to generate higher commer-
cial and residential land values, local govern-
ments use their monopolistic control over
the supply of land to capture land values.
This mechanism creates an institution simi-
lar to the growth machine in which local
political leaders, city planners and media
join land owners to boost land value (He
and Wu, 2005; Hsing, 2010; Lin, 2014; Zhu,
1999). Through promoting land develop-
ment, the local state as de facto land owner
uses land as collateral to gain capital from
the banking system so as to finance long-
term economic development. In essence, the
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use of land development converts short-term
income from land sales into long-term taxes
from businesses.
The behavioural explanation based on
cadre evaluation and promotion goes
beyond machine politics and opens up the
possibility of examining actual politics.
However, economic achievement is only one
of many considerations in career advance-
ment. Alignment with central government
policies or political factions might be
another important factor. The focus on
GDP-ism is thus too narrow. The structural
explanation stresses land revenue maximisa-
tion as the key motivation for urban devel-
opment. But again, the actual operation of
government may not be confined to short-
term revenues and may be more strategic,
going beyond land income, for example, to
industrial upgrading and alignment with
central government policies.
In short, local development and politics
may not be limited to the growth machine
and machine politics but may include the
need to maintain state power. There are also
complex interactions between different levels
of government. The central government still
maintains its power by giving preferential
policies to local governments, endorsing
exemptions, appointing local leaders and
exerting hierarchical control via government
policies (Chien, 2013), while local govern-
ment can deliberately maintain discretion
through state-sanctioned informality and
informal practices exempted from central
control.
Now, to combine these two streams of
explanation, it is useful to relate entrepre-
neurial governance to the Chinese develop-
ment model. The foundation of Chinese
state entrepreneurialism is its economic
development model of the ‘world factory’.
The model is characterised by a close associ-
ation between local urban development and
the global economy. Using relatively lower
prices of land and labour costs, Chinese
cities developed industrial capacities.
Through re-engineering local governance, an
entrepreneurial local state ensures the supply
of low-cost land for industrial activities. In
turn, the supply attracts investment and
rural migrant workers. Foreign investment
has been a major source of capital, in addi-
tion to a high rate of domestic saving. This
development model is supported by a partic-
ular mode of governance which requires the
state’s capacity in land supply (through its
monopolistic position in land acquisition for
land sales) as well as exclusion of rural
migrants from social provision and mainte-
nance of their status as guest workers. The
social reproduction of migrant workers is
entirely left to the market. In the manage-
ment of the production factors of both land
and labour, the role of the state is visible.
Through labour management, costs have
been maintained at a low level, lagging
behind the pace of economic development.
Because of this constraint, the labour force
does not constitute an effective domestic
demand. This is a departure from the mass
production and mass consumption of
Keynesian capitalist economies, because the
model of economic development relies on
overseas markets for expansion of its capi-
tal accumulation. The model also heavily
relies on investment in fixed assets and
infrastructure. Infrastructure development
is reliant upon the mechanism of land value
capture. Local governments have strong
incentives to acquire rural land in order to
set up various development zones (Hsing,
2010). The spatial consequence of this
development model is a scattered pattern
of development and the wide spread of
‘informal settlements’ that provide housing
for rural migrants. While industrial parks
use land lavishly, to maximise land revenue
local governments increasingly encourage
compact and mixed-use developments such




The transformation of urban governance
can be reflected through the process of
urban redevelopment (He and Wu, 2009;
Shin, 2009). Sanjiu redevelopment, or liter-
ally redevelopment of ‘three old types’ of
land (old villages, old urban areas and old
factories) originated from the changing gov-
ernance of land redevelopment. Since 2004,
the central government has strengthened
land management and required that all
developable land should be released through
open auction in a transparent land market.
To protect agricultural land, the central gov-
ernment allocates land development quotas
to local governments (Lin, 2014; Tian et al.,
2017). These policies have slowed down the
pace of land acquisition and urban sprawl
that started in the 1990s. For Guangdong as
a more developed province, the lack of
developable land became a constraint to its
economic growth. To overcome this land
constraint, its former party leader, Wang
Yang, negotiated a special deal with the
Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR).
This policy exempted Guangdong from land
auction for brown development, i.e. three
old types of land. These developments do
not require land development quotas
because they do not occupy agricultural
land. Moreover, the policy of sanjiu allowed
local governments in Guangdong to desig-
nate sanjiu sites and give the development
rights to de facto land users (residents or vil-
lagers) to redevelop the land by themselves
without going through an open land auc-
tion, because local governments lacked the
funding to acquire the land and there was
resistance among villagers to redevelopment.
For a long time, the municipal govern-
ment of Guangzhou as well as other cities in
Guangdong failed to redevelop their urban
villages, because redevelopment was costly.
In Guangzhou, 138 urban villages were
identified but remained undeveloped. The
programme of sanjiu is thus an institutional
innovation to introduce a new method of
land governance to urban regeneration. That
is, the central government exempts local gov-
ernments from an existing regulation of land
management. Through the decentralisation
of power to existing land users, villagers or
de facto owners organise redevelopment
themselves. Hence, it is argued that a frag-
mented authoritarian model might fit its gov-
ernance better (Li and Liu, 2017, this issue).
To achieve the goal of development, the
local state has to relax planning controls
and forgo land profits. In Shenzhen, sites of
sanjiu may be rezoned to create additional
public space or land for public facilities. In
general, sites of sanjiu redevelopment are
divided into three parts: the first is for in situ
rehousing of villagers; the second is given to
developers who contribute to project finance;
and the third is kept as village collective
assets. The land given to developers has fully
delineable property rights. That is, the prop-
erties developed on the land can be trans-
acted in the real estate market. However, the
land assigned to village collectives still
remains rural, collectively owned land. But
the village collective is allowed to develop
the land for industrial and commercial uses.
This type of development contravenes the
regulation that all developments should be
based on land that is ‘commoditised’ (sold in
the open land market), to allow the munici-
pal government to control its supply. In the
village of Liede, for example, a modern hotel
is being built on this assigned land. Although
its appearance may be quite modern, the
hotel is strictly speaking an informal devel-
opment sanctioned by the state.
Although sanjiu projects are developed by
‘communities’, projects need the approval of
the sanjiu office. They require complex plot
ratio calculations to generate sufficient funds
for redevelopment and compensation to vil-
lagers, which often requires raising develop-
ment intensity above the level defined by an
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existing land use plan. The sanjiu office needs
to revise zoning maps and approve the
change in development intensity and uses. To
fund the project, the state has to mobilise
social resources, including villagers, to partic-
ipate in the process of regeneration. The task
of regeneration thus creates a complex issue of
governance: how to reach consensus and how
to distribute benefits. Pre-existing social orga-
nisations – village clans and rural collectives
built upon the clans – help to reach a consen-
sus for redevelopment. Hence the pre-existing
local social structure plays a pivotal role. The
stronger the local organisation, the more
powerfully villagers can negotiate and capture
the benefits of redevelopment. Tangible bene-
fits secured by the village organisation further
strengthen the self-organisation of villagers.
The widely mentioned redevelopment
case, Liede, is an unusual one because of its
timing and the outcome of redevelopment.
The village of Liede is on the route to the
site of the Asian Games organised by
Guangzhou in 2010. Therefore, it was an
urgent task for Guangzhou to renovate the
informal settlement. The municipal govern-
ment had to give up land profits to moder-
nise the built environment (Wu et al., 2013).
The development of Liede was initially not
for generating land profit for the municipal
government, although the village has made a
lot of profit for itself. Similarly, in Shanghai,
Gaojiabang has been demolished and rede-
veloped into an office park. The purpose of
redevelopment is also more strategic and
goes beyond gentrification and land value
appreciation. The redevelopment is intended
to develop higher value-added industries in
globalising Shanghai (Wu, 2016b). These
redevelopment projects have greater ambi-
tions beyond a growth machine. The growth
machine thesis stresses common interests
based on the appreciation of the exchange
value of land, while these redevelopment
projects use the land market to achieve
wider goals.
The sanjiu financial model requires an
approach of wholesale demolition. The gov-
ernance approach allows the participation of
villagers in redevelopment and sharing of the
benefits. This reflects a new mode of govern-
ance as state entrepreneurialism rather than
direct command from an authoritarian state.
Although the landscape has been entirely
transformed and modernised, the govern-
ance of the village collective is preserved.
Through redevelopment, a new informality
has been introduced, as shown in the modern
hotel at Liede as a state-sanctioned informal
development (Wu et al., 2013).
However, the quick release of developable
land through urban regeneration compro-
mised the endeavour to generate land reve-
nue. After the Asian Games, Guangzhou
carried a heavy financial burden for its
investment in infrastructure. Guangzhou
announced the development of several new
towns, each acting as a ‘local capital mobili-
sation and investment platform’ (a state-
owned enterprise) in order to generate more
capital. To control the overall pace of land
supply, the programme of sanjiu regeneration
halted, because land made available by sanjiu
redevelopment is located in central locations
and competes with other projects in peri-
urban or suburban areas which may generate
land revenue for the local governments.
Sanjiu projects illustrate the centrality of
planning in the governance of Chinese urban
transformation. The regeneration pro-
gramme is a carefully chosen strategy to rea-
lise a long-term vision and achieve a more
strategic goal of economic development. It
aims to cope with the constraint on land
supply imposed by central government pol-
icy. The formation of sanjiu policies involves
policy coordination between central and
local government, exemption from central
government policy in designated sanjiu sites,
bargaining between local state and villagers
and a coalition between villagers and develo-
pers as development agencies. Rather than a
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‘non-intervention approach’, the redevelop-
ment of urban villages is subject to guidance
from the state, in particular from the sanjiu
office that approves the list of qualified vil-
lages for redevelopment and modifies land
use plans in order to accommodate increased
development intensity.
Governing urban regeneration includes
the use of market instruments to generate
profit to rehouse villagers and compensate
their interests. However, this is not a pure
property transaction process that leads to
gentrification. For villagers and their lead-
ers, such a project is indeed a chance to
increase the exchange value of their assets.
But the overall objective of sanjiu is not
profits. Rather, it brings a new opportunity
to modernise the built environment, open up
a new space to expand capital accumulation
and sustain investment rather than maximis-
ing land revenue. Behind the scenes there is
intense bargaining and negotiation between
the state, the market and society. The policy
requires ‘institutional innovation’, that is,
doing things differently. In fact, the govern-
ment has to give up land income in order to
make the project financially viable.
Although urban villages, as a prosperous
informal rental market, experience the
absence of the state, their regeneration
reflects a new mode of governance that uses
market instruments but at the same time
maintains planning centrality.
Governing suburban mega urban
projects
Chinese urban transformation is charac-
terised by rapid urban expansion and the
development of new towns (Hsing, 2010;
Shen and Wu, 2013). University towns are a
particular type of new town, building upon
educational uses and university campuses.
Their popularity with state entrepreneurial-
ism needs to be understood with reference to
particular local institutions. First, in the
2000s China began to see the impact of eco-
nomic restructuring and realise the impor-
tance of science and technology. Universities
were allowed to significantly expand their
student recruitment. Secondly, educational
land uses were exempted from compulsory
land auction which had been introduced
since 2004. Local governments were enthusi-
astic about expanding educational uses.
Thirdly, large Chinese cities had entered a
period of rapid urban expansion and soon
faced tighter land management by the cen-
tral government. A compact form of subur-
ban development was encouraged. But the
suburbs were largely underdeveloped or
scattered with urban sprawl. In order to
increase the attractiveness of the suburbs,
the local government released suburban land
cheaply to universities which were allowed
to borrow development funds based on their
projected student recruitment numbers. The
development of suburban university cam-
puses did not add a financial burden to the
local state. Fourthly, through the develop-
ment of university campuses, the suburban
new town could attract more residents to
justify the development of infrastructure and
services. The development of university cam-
puses thus became an effective way to stimu-
late initial suburbanisation. Lastly, most
university towns are located in the suburbs.
As greenfield developments, these can be
master-planned to achieve an instant land-
scaping effect.
Applying a modernist approach, the scale
of university towns is usually too grand and
lacks an urban atmosphere. They are not
accessible and lack walkability. Although
the rationale of developing common facili-
ties for different universities is plausible, in
reality the development lacks coordination.
Staff and students do not manage to socia-
lise beyond their individual campuses.
University towns are built more like a devel-
opment zone rather than an urban area,
lacking social interaction and services.
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In essence, university towns are mega
urban projects, just like other major infra-
structure developments, for example trans-
port hubs (Jiang et al., 2016). In this case,
university towns are not a product of a post-
Fordist knowledge economy, which sees the
dispersal of economic activities in the metro-
politan region, but are clustered at specific
localities. In the Chinese case, university
towns are an outcome of city planning.
They represent not just residential suburba-
nisation but also post-suburban develop-
ment which involves the participation of
multiple actors through entrepreneurial
land development and infrastructure provi-
sion (Li et al., 2014). The politics of devel-
opment include the use of the public sector
to gain land at a discounted price.
Development is also driven by changing
land management and policies which
encourage compact development such as
transit-oriented developments (TODs) and
new towns. With the increase in land val-
ues, such a compact development form is
becoming possible, as now only a smaller
amount of land is needed to capture the
land value needed to support infrastructure
development.
Lingang, one of nine new towns in
Shanghai, is another example that illustrates
the features of governing mega urban proj-
ects. Located about 75 kilometres from the
city centre, Lingang is an entirely new city
that combines industrial and residential uses.
In 2001, following the construction of the
Yangshan deep-water container port,
Shanghai perceived an opportunity to
develop advanced manufacturing industries
and thus initiated the development of
Lingang. An advanced manufacturing zone
was set up. To support industrial develop-
ment, a new town near the manufacturing
zone was planned. In 2002, a German-based
architectural firm, Gerkan, Marg and
Partners, won the competition for the con-
ceptual master plan, and designed circular
zones surrounding a gigantic ‘water-drop
lake’ (dishuihu). The design was inspired by
the concept of the ‘garden city’.
As in many other development zones, a
management committee model suitable for
entrepreneurial development was adopted
(Wu and Phelps, 2011). The industrial zone
was governed by Lingang Industrial Park
Management Committee, and the residential
new town was managed by Nanhui New
Town Management Committee. This led to
a problem of coordination between indus-
trial and residential development. In 2012,
they were merged to form the Management
Committee of Lingang Region. However, as
an entrepreneurial governance model, the
driver of development really came from
development corporations. In Lingang, there
are two major development corporations.
Lingang and Harbour-city development cor-
porations are responsible respectively for
industrial and new town development. The
former is a state-owned enterprise (SOE),
belonging to the municipal government of
Shanghai, while the Harbour-city belongs to
the district government.
In short, the development of Lingang has
been enacted through strategically sending a
municipal SOE of the Shanghai government
to the town to achieve its development
vision. The generation of land revenue was
not a major motivation for developing
Lingang. But in order to develop the new
town, the land market was used by the
development corporations. In order to gain
the support of rural communities, an area of
one square kilometre of land was allocated
to each of four rural towns in the area for
them to create their own mini development
zones within the new town. Through
reclaiming land from the sea and consolidat-
ing former rural communities, the develop-
ment corporations control large parcels of
land. These large areas are regarded as
attractive spaces to develop strategic indus-
tries that require large land parcels, such as
Wu 7
aviation and heavy equipment manufactur-
ing. The governance of Lingang is not only
‘entrepreneurial’ but also involves complex
coordination between different levels of gov-
ernment. Although Lingang is a strategic
project of the Shanghai municipal govern-
ment, in order to motivate the district gov-
ernment of Pudong Lingang is managed by
the latter, which is known as a ‘municipally
owned but district-managed’ (shi shu qu
guan) model.
Peripheral developments in the metropoli-
tan region have been interpreted with differ-
ent theoretical explanations: as ‘edge cities’
in the economic dynamics of metropolitan
dispersal and local clustering of office devel-
opment (Garreau, 1991); as an outcome of
‘neoliberal suburbanism’ (Peck, 2011), which
is driven by entrepreneurial business commu-
nities; or as a process driven by different gov-
ernance modalities including the state, capital
accumulation and authoritarian private gov-
ernance (Ekers et al., 2012). Here, we interpret
Chinese new towns as an outcome combining
planning centrality and market instruments
under state entrepreneurialism.
First and foremost, as shown in the
studies of university towns (Sum, 2017, this
issue) and new towns (Shen and Wu, 2017),
they are mega urban projects created by
planning centrality, because they are not
only master-planned but are also produced
by planning policies. The policy of land
development quotas leads to land consoli-
dation in suburban areas (Tian et al.,
2017). New towns are planning products.
They usually adopt various planning con-
cepts such as ‘garden cities’ or TODs,
although actual implementation may devi-
ate from the original discourse and create
undesirable outcomes such as separation
between jobs and residences and long-
distance commuting. They are initiated
with more strategic considerations, for
example to enhance education, science and
technology, to build advanced manufactur-
ing industries or to establish an interna-
tional shipping centre for a globalising city.
On the other hand, the operation has to
resort to market mechanisms and the coordi-
nation of diverse actors. The implementation
of suburban development requires an inno-
vative use of market instruments and gov-
ernance adjustment. Their development also
represents a financialised approach to urban
development (Theurillat, 2017), which facili-
tates capital accumulation (Shen and Wu,
2017). The management committee (guan
wei hui) only provides an overall governance
framework. The actual development tasks
are carried out by development corpora-
tions, usually state-owned enterprises. They
belong to different levels of government and
are managed by the state assets committee
(guo zi wei).
Governing the countryside
Chinese spatial governance is characterised
by urban–rural dualism. The development
of a new governance approach means that
urban and rural areas are no longer treated
as separate entities but as being linked in the
same ‘urban’ process, arguably now a pro-
cess of ‘planetary urbanisation’ (Brenner
and Schmid, 2015). In the countryside, the
capitalist urban process affects the develop-
ment of vast hinterlands for cities.
The transformation of the countryside in
China started with the policy of a ‘new
socialist countryside’ in the mid-2000s.
Seeing the countryside as a potential space
to absorb production capacity and thus sti-
mulate economic growth, the policy
attempted to modernise the countryside,
albeit under the rhetoric of reducing urban–
rural inequalities. Expansionist state entre-
preneurialism extended planning power into
largely ‘unplanned’ rural areas, initially
through so-called ‘urban–rural integration
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planning’ (Qian and Wong, 2012), and later
formalised in the 2008 City and Countryside
Planning Act. Since the formalisation of
land markets and strengthened land man-
agement with the protection of ‘basic agri-
cultural land’, a regulated land supply has
facilitated the development of land-driven
urban development in China (Lin, 2014). In
contrast to enhanced urban governance,
rural public finance is very weak (Po, 2012).
Private governance and services supported
by rural collectives are still a key feature of
rural governance. The abolition of agricul-
tural taxes led to the declining capacity of
public finance in rural areas. In the Pearl
River Delta, services were mainly reliant on
the rental income of rural collectives. The
global financial crisis of 2008 reduced rental
incomes and placed added pressures on vil-
lage shareholder companies. In Dongguan,
villages incurred heavy debts, suggesting the
deepening of an economic crisis into a finan-
cial crisis of entrepreneurial governance
(Xue and Wu, 2015).
The global financial crisis in 2008 has
made state entrepreneurialism rely more on
SOEs as an economic development driver.
The 4-trillion Yuan financial stimulus pack-
age was allocated through the national eco-
nomic and reform commission (the former
planning commission under the centrally
planned economy) and implemented by
SOEs through infrastructure investment.
The demand for land has led to a new mean-
ing of governing the countryside. In con-
junction with the environmental discourse,
rural land consolidation aims to transfer
development quotas from rural areas to the
city for mega development projects, which is
characterised by two seemingly contradic-
tory tendencies: using market instruments
but at the same time enhancing state control.
More ‘neoliberal’ entrepreneurial activities
in the rural PRD, for example, with foreign
investment and rural governance depending
upon rental income, have collapsed. Instead,
a rising new movement of urbanisation has
seen the state consolidate its governance of
the countryside.
In this context, we start examining the
complex dynamics of rural governance. The
characteristics of planning centrality in gov-
erning the countryside can be seen from the
Village Improvement Programme in Jiangsu
(Wu and Zhou, 2013) (also Shen and Shen,
2017, this issue). In order to understand
rural governance in China, we need to
understand the Chinese particularity of
urban–rural dualism. The provision of pub-
lic services is mainly confined within urban
areas. In rural areas, there has been a lack of
governance capacity, especially after the
abolition of the agricultural tax (Po, 2012).
Even in Jiangsu, where there has been a
strong tradition of collective rural economy,
public finances in rural areas are weak. The
rural living environment is underdeveloped,
especially in terms of public services. With
the support of the provincial government,
the Department of Construction initiated a
major plan for improving rural villages in
2012. The aim is mainly to improve the
physical environment and deal with public
hygiene, water-course maintenance, waste
collection and transfer, safe drinking water
and the recycling of animal manure as well
as landscaping and the preservation of cul-
tural heritage.
However, the provincial government has
quite limited financial resources to fund the
improvement of the vast number of rural vil-
lages. A new approach to ‘governance’ has
thus been invented to mobilise society’s
resources. The government allocated modest
funds for pilot projects. Universities and
planning institutes were asked to participate
in the campaign. Villagers were asked to take
a major role in renovation and refurbish-
ment. Rural tourism was introduced to
incentivise villagers to invest in their environ-
ment. However, the village improvement
programme does not have profit as a motive.
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Initially, it was not even for place promo-
tion. Rather, the programme was initiated to
demonstrate the alignment of provincial gov-
ernment policies with the vision of the cen-
tral government. In 2012, the new Chinese
leader, Xi Jinping, announced a new vision
to build ‘Beautiful China’. Recognising rural
and urban inequalities and the under-
provision of public services in rural areas,
the Jiangsu provincial government developed
its village improvement programme. The
most successful case is the combination of
rural tourism with a physical improvement
programme. For example, a town near
Nanjing has allegedly been developed into
the first ‘slow city’ in China (Wu, 2015). For
places that lack tourist attractions or are far
away from major cities, because of the lack
of a sustainable business model it is difficult
to maintain funding for village improve-
ment. Some have been criticised as ‘face-lift-
ing projects’ because they merely painted the
walls. Although the village improvement
programme promotes incremental redeve-
lopment and allows farmers to keep their
property rights, in some places the pro-
gramme began to deviate from its original
design and started to bargain with the devel-
opment rights of existing rural areas and
transfer quotas of developable land for land
development in the cities.
From the above analysis, we can see that
the recent effort to govern the countryside
through new village improvement pro-
grammes has been driven by complex moti-
vations: it does not originate from a ‘growth
machine’. On the other hand, neither is it a
welfare project that simply extends public
services to the countryside. It uses govern-
ance techniques to mobilise social resources,
focusing firstly on the physical living envi-
ronment and secondly on rural tourism
which brings capital to sustain funding.
During the operation, market instruments
are explored and applied. Sometimes, these
have driven the programme to become more
of a development project which may displace
the rural population.
Agencies and informalities
China’s urban transformation has an
immense impact on residents, and has signif-
icant implications for urban life. Residential
segregation between migrants and local resi-
dents tends to reinforce social distrust and
exclusion (Liu et al., 2017, this issue). The
lack of urban hukou status severely con-
strains rural migrant workers’ job opportu-
nities; even with a college education they are
discriminated against and have little chance
of working in the state sector (Xiao and
Bian, 2017, this issue). However, urban
dwellers and migrants are not passive
objects. They show active agency in shaping
and changing the living environment. The
urban is a lived experience (Lefebvre, 1991),
and in this sense urban dwellers have a right
to the city. This right includes but goes
beyond property rights and the right to stay,
and in essence is the right to determine urban
changes. Through their agencies, urban
dwellers and migrants attempt to overcome
political economic constraints and are creat-
ing a space of their own. As for rural
migrants, they cannot afford to buy com-
modity housing and tactically choose to live
in urban villages. Living in a migrant enclave
is an outcome of residential differentiation.
But their action subverts residential segrega-
tion. They choose migrant enclaves partly
because in many places they are able to build
a dense social network. For example, in a
place nicknamed xiaohubei (little Hubei) in
Guangzhou, migrants from the same town
of Tianmen in Hubei are all engaged in tex-
tile manufacturing and business. A trans-
local network links the home town and the
cities (Liu et al., 2015). Resettled residents in
a new environment try to make the living
environment more suitable for their needs
(Zhang et al., 2017, this issue). Dwellers in
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the old urban area of Shanghai seized the
opportunity of a rising demand for rental
housing in central areas and upgraded their
properties (Arkaraprasertkul, 2017, this
issue). Rather than being isolated, rural
migrants in the enclaves managed to main-
tain active socialising (Wu and Logan,
2015), partly owing to informal and semi-
public space and partly because their mar-
ginal social status made them more depen-
dent upon local social networks. In
suburban gated communities, residents form
homeowners’ associations to claim the right
to manage their residences.
In urban villages, there are strong incen-
tives for villagers to expand and renovate
housing in order to gain more rental income.
In urban areas, existing property owners
improve their residential living environment
so as to attract new tenants (Zhan, 2017, this
issue). In this case of self-improvement, there
is no obvious displacement as usually seen in
the process of gentrification. A neoliberal
and entrepreneurial governance would allow
upgrading and self-building to generate more
rental income. However, existing planning
regulations try to control self-build activities
to ensure that development rights are con-
trolled by the local state. From this we can
see that entrepreneurialism is used more as a
market mechanism for the benefit of the
state. The deterioration of the living environ-
ment in urban villages is caused by strict
control over self-improvement (Wu, 2016a).
When the living environment becomes more
dilapidated, the government then begins to
get control over the land through demolition
and requisition. Gaojiabang in Shanghai is
such an example (Wu, 2016b).
Planning centrality does not mean that
Chinese cities can eliminate informality. As
Roy (2005) has argued, for a pro-market
governance informality is a mode of urbani-
sation. For urban villages in China, there
have been three sources of informalities (Wu
et al., 2013): first, rural land regulation was
lax, and there was an ambiguity of collective
ownership. Second, to save costs, the state
obtained farm land during land acquisition
but left out the villages. In southern China,
there was a practice of allowing villages to
keep additional collectively owned land as
part of the compensation for their farm land.
Third, municipal public services do not cover
rural villages. Village collectives provide
informal and private services.
The continuation of informality is also
due to state entrepreneurialism. First, infor-
mal practices and market approaches sub-
vert formal regulations and plans. On the
streets of Chinese cities, there have been con-
stant battles between vendors in informal
markets and officials (Huang et al., 2014).
Second, because the state no longer controls
all means and resources, state entrepreneurial-
ism needs to mobilise various actors and use
market resources. In this sense, it is govern-
ance rather than the government that affects
the course of urban transformation. With the
decentralisation of resources, urban develop-
ment is no longer determined by the state. On
the ground, the state has to relax control for
practical reasons and the outcome may not be
determined by the plan. Urban villages are a
good example to show that the state lacks the
capacity to provide affordable housing to
rural migrants and consequently the private
rental market plays such a role. Significant
informality is thus inevitable.
Examining agencies and informalities can
lead to a more nuanced understanding of
state entrepreneurialism. The governance
approach means that the state in its govern-
ing urban transformation has to compromise
and give space to agencies. But there is a
limit. The politics of exclusion are justified
by the state through its growth-first entre-
preneurialism. According to the post-
political perspective, greater market orienta-
tion is leading to the decline of Western dem-
ocratic political processes (Swyngedouw,
2009). The state is captured by and thus
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represents the interests of capital. Consensus
for urban change is reached through techni-
cal rationality rather than a need to redistri-
bute welfare. In Chinese urban
transformation, such a tendency towards
promoting growth is also visible. For exam-
ple, the Beautiful China campaign, redeve-
loping old areas and establishing high-tech
and business parks are all seen as less politi-
cal than the improvement of the living envi-
ronment and the better use of space. But the
distributional effect and how the existing
population is affected are unquestioned.
Conclusion
In a recent article concerning the debates in
urban theory, Storper and Scott (2016) criti-
cised postcolonial urban theory for its parti-
cularism and provincialisation of knowledge.
However, their own understanding of a uni-
versal theory based on agglomeration as a
basic driving force is criticised by compara-
tive urban theorists (Robinson and Roy,
2016) for its narrow economic focus and lack
of attention to different institutions in the
Global South, which may lead to an alterna-
tive theoretical construct rather than being a
variant of the theory derived from the
Global North. Peck (2015), however, stands
in between these positions and argues that
there is value in comparing cities but that
this stance of comparison should not be
overplayed to become particularism.
Understanding the shift of urban governance
would be a good case to illustrate the value
of variegated geographies and their potential
contribution to theory building.
Contemporary urban transformation is
characterised by the rising dominance of the
capitalist urban process which is evolving
towards a greater role for the market
(Harvey, 1978; Peck, 2011, 2016). The gov-
ernment is no longer a single actor, and in
this sense, is becoming governance. This
process is similarly seen in post-reform
China, which is a kind of entrepreneurialism
beyond the business sphere. So far, attention
has been paid to resources outside the gov-
ernment, institutional innovation concerning
central–local relations, decentralisation and
recentralisation and the establishment of a
land market to achieve its goal. However,
the state does not passively follow the logic
of capital accumulation; rather, the state
itself has a vested interest in maintaining its
power. A necessary measure to maintain its
power is to sustain capital accumulation.
This means that the rising form of post-
reform Chinese governance is characterised
by an ‘urban’ process to achieve a spatial
fix. Market instruments are used in the pro-
cess. While there is an attempt to see China
as a variant of capitalism, seeing it as a
derived instance of Northern theory may
not be sufficient to understand the new fea-
tures emerging from institutional particulari-
ties (Peck and Zhang, 2013). This article
highlights that planning centrality is a salient
feature of state entrepreneurialism, and that
the state actively tries to modify, change and
adjust its governance practices.
In the West, the neoliberal attack on
planning has led to its role being confined to
fixing externality (Allmendinger, 2009). In
contrast to a very passive planning response
to the ascendant market mechanism,
Chinese planning is more proactive towards
its growth agenda (Wu, 2015). This is
another and different type of response to
market orientation. Seen from a wider per-
spective, the Chinese case may contribute to
our understanding of different possibilities
of governing urban transformation, within
which neoliberalist planning may be one
type among many. Greater orientation
towards the market does not automatically
lead to the reduction of planning. Rather, it
strengthens the politics of using market
instruments. Coupled with the existence of
political elites, such a process, in the context
of western democratic politics, may be
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described more appropriately as a regulatory
capitalism (Raco, 2014) and an exclusionary
post-political approach (Swyngedouw,
2009).
Local state corporatism (Oi, 1992) is a
theory derived from observing Chinese rural
reform. However, the theory is mainly based
on the observation of Chinese rural cadres.
It emphasises ‘particularism’ and has not
been considered in comparison with wider
urban entrepreneurialism. On the other
hand, ‘urban’ entrepreneurialism needs to be
questioned in terms of the meaning of the
urban. Here, from observing Chinese urban
governance, we argue for an alternative con-
cept of ‘state entrepreneurialism’ to describe
the use of market instruments and means to
achieve the state’s strategic goals. The notion
of state entrepreneurialism emphasises more
political reasons for this emerging entrepre-
neurial behaviour. The purpose of shifting
from government to governance is not for
the market but for using market means to
solve the crisis created by the contradictions
arising during urbanisation and urban trans-
formation, and ultimately to maintain state
power.
While ‘urban entrepreneurialism’
describes the change of governance in the
urban sphere, it is vital to ask what is the
‘urban’. Despite rising localities, the city
itself is not an actor (Cochrane, 2007). There
has not been a shift of power from the state
to the ‘urban’ elites in China. Local officials
who demonstrate entrepreneurial behaviour
are a constituent of the state apparatus. The
development regime may involve various
actors and their pro-growth coalitions, but
these agencies originate from different moti-
vations, some of which are strategic beyond
the appreciation of land values. Local parti-
cularity needs to be incorporated into the
thesis of the growth machine (Logan and
Molotch, 1987) as part of its theoretical con-
struct. Rather than being seen as a variant
of Western democratic machine politics,
particularity and the specific institutional
set-up should be seen as part of the causal
effect and as constituents of the dynamics.
That is, the theoretical logic is not indepen-
dent of the local context.
There are different explanations for
Chinese entrepreneurial governance: the
attempt to capture land values, a driver to
fill the gap in public expenditure and the
desire for political career advancement.
These explanations are possible but focus
too narrowly on particularities. Studies in
urban governance (McCann, 2016) provide
some theoretical inspiration. Here we see
governing Chinese urban transformation as
an attempt to carve out a space for accumu-
lation – a ‘spatial fix’. Planning occupies a
central position in this process. The state
apparatus has its own vested interest in
maintaining its power through adapting gov-
ernance approaches. This too results from
the crisis of capital accumulation and the
contradiction between extracting social sur-
plus and the realisation of the surplus. The
analysis emphasises a different planning
rationale – one as a democratic political pro-
cess which is perceived as a constraint to
expansion, and one as a part of the state
apparatus, perceived as an instrument to
expand the scope of accumulation into new
towns and new areas but also to regenerate
urban areas and the countryside.
The study of Chinese urban governance
helps to shed light on some observations in
the West from a different angle. In discuss-
ing neoliberalism, Harvey (2007) emphasises
that the essential feature of neoliberalism is
not about the free market or following mar-
ket logic but rather to achieve ‘class restora-
tion’, or as a ‘state-assisted project for the
restoration of capitalist class rule’ (Peck and
Zhang, 2013: 378). In a more recent article,
Peck (2016) suggests that the concept of the
entrepreneurial city should be historicised
now as ‘the specific circumstances of con-
temporary urban restructuring in the United
Wu 13
States’ (Peck, 2016: 1), that is, the growth
machine now turning into ‘coercive applica-
tions of financially driven and technocrati-
cally managed restructuring’ (Peck, 2016: 6).
This is a value extraction machine. The
Chinese case, through its difference, even
suggests that value capture may be part of
the considerations of a new governance
approach but ultimately this approach is not
just ‘for profit’: the state apparatus is not
equivalent to a business establishment, no
matter how it behaves entrepreneurially.
Both cases provide a temporally and geogra-
phically different picture of urban
entrepreneurialism.
In conclusion, during China’s urban
transformation, planning occupies a central-
ity in governing social-spatial changes,
because planning, as part of the state appa-
ratus, is driven by a motivation beyond just
facilitating market operation. In a growth
machine, planning is an auxiliary actor that
is affiliated to growth interests and has bene-
fited from growth, which is used to explain
the pro-growth behaviour of place promo-
tion. Here, planning for growth is the other
way around, using market instruments to
achieve state power. Planning is a strategic
endeavour to promote growth without direct
command in a centrally planned economy.
State entrepreneurialism uses market instru-
ments made available through institutional
innovation to extend the state’s position into
the market sphere and maintain state power.
Rather than being replaced by market
power, state power is reinforced by its use of
market instruments. While profits could be
made during market operations assisted by a
state monopoly, the incentive, seen as an
overall process of governing urban transfor-
mation, is more strategic. The intention has
never been to use neoliberalism to reduce
state power but rather, through institutional
reform and innovation, to deploy diverse
governance techniques.
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